International relations theory has long assumed that the modern international system is a state of nature devoid of political authority. This assumption of international anarchy is a foundation of realist thought and is believed to lead to the security dilemma that pervades relations between all states.
ask the question." 8 On the same day in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, however, British economic historian Niall Ferguson took a diametrically opposed view: "The great thing about the American empire is that so many Americans disbelieve in its existence. . . . They think they're so different that when they have bases in foreign territories, it's not an empire. When they invade sovereign territory, it's not an empire." 9 These contrasting statements embody the widespread and profound confusion today over the nature of international hierarchy, of which empire is merely an extreme form.
Focusing on the anarchy of the international system, extant theories of international relations offer few guides to these hierarchical relationships. This article attempts to ªll this gap by providing a general framework for understanding international hierarchy in the contemporary world. I endeavor to make three points. First, I argue that the discipline of international relations, via juristic theories of the state, imported a formal-legal conception of authority that precludes, by deªnition, the possibility of hierarchy between political units. I pose an alternative, relational conception of authority that uncovers hierarchical relationships between states now hidden by the formal-legal approach.
Second, I outline a conception of international hierarchy as variations in authority exerted by a dominant state over a subordinate party. I then identify salient forms of hierarchy across the dimensions of security and economic relations. Although operationalizing international hierarchy is difªcult and remains tentative, it is possible to measure the construct in ways that appear conceptually valid.
Third, I examine the effect of hierarchy on defense spending in all countries from 1950 to 2000. As explained in greater detail below, in a relational conception, the legitimate authority of a dominant state rests on the provision of a stable social order for its subordinates. This exchange of social order for compliance implies that countries subordinate to a dominant state should spend less on their militaries as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) than countries not in such authority relationships, all else constant. Security hierarchy, as predicted, but not economic hierarchy exerts a statistically and substantively signiªcant effect on military spending.
Each argument is developed in a separate section below. Together, they build a new foundation that integrates hierarchy into the core of international relations theory. As developed in the conclusion, a focus on hierarchy further erodes the distinction between domestic and international politics and suggests new avenues for research. It also sheds light on the role of the United States in the world today and the growing backlash against the country's "imperialist" policies. In pursuing a unilateral policy of preventive regime change in Iraq, the United States has overstepped the bounds of what its subordinates and others regard as its legitimate authority. This threatens to undermine the fragile hierarchy nurtured by successive U.S. presidents over the last century.
Political Authority in World Politics
A political relationship is anarchic if the units-in this case, states-possess no authority over one another. It is hierarchic when one unit, the dominant state, possesses authority over a second, subordinate state. To understand this distinction, and the role it has assumed in international relations theory, requires revisiting the concept of political authority and, then, examining how a particular conception became enshrined into the discipline.
the concept of political authority Political authority is most simply deªned as rightful rule. 10 When political authority is exercised, the dominant state commands a subordinate state to alter its behavior, where command implies that the former has the right to order the latter to take certain actions. This right, in turn, implies a correlative obligation or duty by the subordinate state to comply, if possible, with the dominant state's order. As Richard Flathman observes, "If A has authority X, those persons who are in A's jurisdiction therefore have an obligation or obligations Y." In short, the subordinate "surrenders judgment" and accepts the force of the dominant state's command. 11 The subordinate state's obligation implies a further correlative right by the dominant state to enforce its command in the event of noncompliance. As John Day notes, "Those who possess authority in political life, the rulers, are authorized not only to make laws and take decisions but to use coercive power when necessary to ensure obedience to those laws and acquiescence in those decisions." 12 In an authority relationship, the subordinate state recognizes both that the dominant state has the right to issue certain commands and that it should, within the limits of its abilities, follow those commands or suffer appropriate consequences. In short, the subordinate accepts the dominant state's commands as legitimate.
Two implications of this simple deªnition of political authority deserve elaboration. First, authority is a form of power. Following Robert Dahl's famous deªnition, power is the ability of one state to get another to do something it would otherwise not do. 13 In the case of authority, the subordinate state's behavior is driven by obligation, not force. The operative condition, however, is the same: because of the dominant state's will, the subordinate does something it would otherwise not do. The commonly asserted opposition between power and authority is, thus, ill founded.
Second, as legitimate domination, political authority is analytically distinct from coercion, but it is intimately bound up with this second form of power. Purely coercive relationships-as when a mugger demands "your money or your life"-are characterized by power, but they are not authoritative. Although complying in the face of superior force may be wise, no obligation exists to do so. Indeed, the purpose of coercion is to manipulate incentives so that it is in the target's interests to comply, but again this implies no obligation. It is the duty to comply with the dominant state's commands-or, alternatively, the legitimacy of those commands-that renders authority and coercion conceptually distinct.
The difference between political authority and coercion is nicely captured in Kenneth Waltz's ªrst and third dimensions of political structure. The ªrst dimension is the ordering principle, or the way in which the units stand in relationship to one another. In Waltz's conception, this refers to the authority relationship between the units, embodied in the difference between anarchy, in which "none is entitled to command; none is required to obey," and hierarchy, in which some are so entitled and others so required.
14 The third dimension is the distribution of capabilities, which is often mistaken for the distribution of power. Capabilities matter for Waltz because they create opportunities for coercion: more capable states can impose their will on others, up to and including eliminating states as independent entities; less capable states suffer the wills of others. 15 Waltz remains true to his realism in emphasizing power. But in a way that is not widely appreciated, his dimensions of political structure are deªned by different forms of power.
Although distinct, political authority and coercion are intimately related,
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with the latter constituting a necessary component of the former. The capacity for coercion, if not actual coercion, is necessary to buttress or sustain authority in the face of incentives to ºout rules designed to constrain behavior. Even as it recognizes that it should comply with the dominant state's edicts, any subordinate state may choose to violate any rule. An obligation creates only an expectation of compliance, but this does not require perfect obedience. One can exceed the speed limit, for instance, without calling into question the government's authority to impose such limits. The obligatory nature of the dominant state's command, however, also permits it to punish a subordinate for noncompliance, implying that in choosing to violate a command, a subordinate is also choosing to accept the sanction that the dominant state may impose. Given incentives by subordinates not to comply in speciªc instances, the dominant state must use coercion to enforce edicts and, by example, to deter defection by other subordinates. Especially in large groups where free riding is possible, coercion may be necessary to prevent widespread violation of commands and, thus, the erosion of authority. Yet, even as political authority and coercion are complements over some range, they can be substitutes as well in the short run or when the ruler has exogenous sources of coercive capability. Domestically, when their authority is contested, rulers may increase their use of coercion in an attempt to stay in power, employing the proverbial policeman on every corner and informant in every group to deter challengers. When rulers have access to resources that can be mobilized for coercion independent from those over whom they rulesuch as monarchical lands in feudal times and oil, diamonds, or other natural resources today-they may be able to maintain power through coercion even in the absence of authority. Regimes that rely on coercion instead of authority are often called (ironically) "authoritarian" or, more graphically, "tyrannies." 16 In international relations, states that rely on coercion rather than authority in their relationships with other states are often referred to as "imperialist." 17 In an imperialist strategy, one state tries to dominate another through force. This strategy is tempting because states typically have sources of power-their own domestic resources-separate from those they seek to subordinate. In this way, imperialism is the international analog to tyranny. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . The common root of the terms "empire" and "imperialism" produces confusion. Imperialism was originally a term of opprobrium coined to describe Napoleon's ambitions in Europe. It implies illegitimate coercion. Empire ªrst described Rome, which was largely authoritative in the sense used here. Today, many who criticize the new American empire are more accurately criticizing the imperialism inherent in the strategy of preventive regime change.
Despite their clear analytic differences, political authority and coercion are hard to distinguish in practice. They are deeply intertwined, making it difªcult for analysts to conclude whether, in any given instance, a subordinate state followed a dominant state's command out of obligation or force. There is no "bright line" separating these two analytic concepts, and I offer none here. Below, I operationalize hierarchy, and the authority that underlies this variable, in ways that aim to capture the legitimacy of an authority relationship between dominant and subordinate states. But even in these measures, authority is buttressed by the capacity for coercion. This is not a failure of the analysis or measures, but a reºection of the intimate connection between political authority and coercion.
formal-legal to relational authority in international relations Modern conceptions of political authority, including those in international relations, are given fullest expression in the work of Max Weber who, in describing the modern bureaucratic state, developed an ideal type of formal-legal authority. 18 For Weber, and nearly everyone else since, the ruler's ability to command subordinates, and the willingness of the subordinates to comply, follows from the lawful position or ofªce that the ruler holds. In this conception, the ruler possesses the right to issue laws due to the ofªce that she occupies, not to any personal qualities that she may possess. 19 Authority does not inhere in the ruler as a person, but in the ruler as an ofªcer. By analogy, authority is law, and vice versa.
Building on juristic theories of the state, popular at the turn of the last century, international relations scholars imported this formal-legal conception of authority into the discipline's theoretical foundation. 20 It immediately follows from this conception that international politics lack authority. Because there is no lawful position or institution above the state, there can be no authority above the state. International relations, therefore, are a realm of anarchy, and all relations between duly constituted states are also anarchic. As noted in the introduction, this line of reasoning has been accepted by theorists working in all of the discipline's major paradigms.
Although perhaps useful for analyzing established domestic hierarchies, a formal-legal conception of authority is of dubious utility for the study of international relations. Despite its debt to Thomas Hobbes, formal-legal theory founders on how authority emerges from the state of nature, which it obviously did at some distant point in time to create the states that now make up the international system. If political authority derives from lawful ofªce, law must precede authority. But if political authority creates law, then authority must precede lawful ofªce. In building the preconditions necessary to transcend the state of nature, the formal-legal approach cannot conceive of law without authority or authority without law. The origins of authority must rest on something other than a formal-legal order. 21 It cannot follow, therefore, that absent a formal-legal structure there can be no authority. Authority must be able to exist independent of any formal-legal structure. This has important repercussions for the prevailing view of international relations as a state of nature.
Rather than conceiving of authority as a product of formal-legal structures, the literatures on emergent social structures and contractual theories of the state contain an alternative, relational conception of authority. 22 In this approach, authority rests on a bargain between the ruler and the ruled premised on the former's provision of a social order of value sufªcient to offset the latter's loss of freedom. Social order requires a measure of security for individuals, the protection of property rights, and an expectation that promises between individuals will be kept. 23 Authority then becomes a contingent relationship in which the ruler provides the order demanded by subordinates, and they in turn accept the authority of the ruler to impose taxes or other extractions and to exert the restraints on their behavior necessary to provide that social order. In this exchange of social order for compliance, both sides are made better off, at least with regard to the state of nature that would otherwise exist. The ruler bears the administrative and coercive costs of providing the social order, but gains the consent of subordinates to her rules and exactions. Subordinates gain the beneªts of social order and give up a measure of autonomy or, in the case of states, sovereignty. In this conception, authority is not law, but a contract.
Relational authority is inherently strategic. Both ruler and ruled are integral 4-6. to the contract: the former must produce an acceptable social order; the latter must consent to the former's authority. In a relational approach, the focus of analysis subtly shifts from ruler to ruled. Obligation ºows not from the commands of the ruler, but from the consent of the ruled; a ruler does not possess authority unless her subordinates acknowledge an obligation to comply with her will. Importantly, the ruler's authority and her ability to use coercion legitimately follow from the subordinate's satisfaction with the social order so produced. Obligation springs not from coercion. Rather, authority and the capacity to coerce legitimately derive from the interest of the ruled in social order. 24 This relational conception provides a more complete and consistent account of the origins of political authority. Although the formation of authority from within the state of nature is, of course, shrouded in the mists of time, a relational conception appears consistent with what scholars know about the process. In the anthropological literature on contact-era Melanesia, to cite one example from the literature on early authority structures, one prominent form is the local "big man," an individual who uses his comparative advantage in material accumulation to generate wealth and, in turn, to earn authority over those who become his followers. In a related conception drawn from the same region and period, Maurice Godelier posits a "great man" model in which individuals use their comparative advantage in hunting and ªghting, gardening, or ritual knowledge to attain authority over others. Productive abilities, knowledge, and ªghting skill all appear to be resources that potential leaders can use to produce a local social order and, in turn, authority. 25 Importantly, formal-legal institutions, to the extent they exist at all, follow rather than drive this process. In this example, as in others, authority rests on the ruler's ability to deliver the "goods" demanded by the ruled and the latter's willingness to recognize as legitimate the status of the former.
If authority can emerge as part of an equilibrium between ruler and ruled from the state of nature, then it cannot be excluded by deªnition in relations between states within the global system. A relational conception of authority, based on the exchange of social order for compliance, opens the possibility that political authority can exist at the international level, at least for certain dyads. The long history of European empire is a case in point, but so is the Soviet Union's informal empire in Eastern Europe; the United States' protectorates over Japan, the Philippines, and Micronesia after World War II; and the weak protectorate formed by the United States and Saudi Arabia during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War-none of which had prior "legal" standing. 26 States can escape the state of nature, at least in part, by building relationships founded on relational rather than formal-legal authority. Understood in relational terms, the nature and degree of political authority in international relations together become a variable for empirical investigation.
Hierarchy in International Relations
Hierarchy exists when one actor, the dominant state, possesses authority over another actor, the subordinate state. Authority is never total, of course, but varies in extent. A dominant state may possess authority over a subordinate and issue commands regulating possible actions 1-5 but not on actions 6-n, which remain beyond its ability to expect compliance. In other words, the subordinate state may recognize the legitimacy of the dominant state's commands regulating actions 1-5, but not that of commands it may issue on other possible actions. In this case, a partial hierarchy exists; the dominant state possesses some limited authority over the subordinate state. In turn, hierarchy increases with the number of the subordinate's actions the dominant state can legitimately regulate. If the dominant state expands its authority from issues 1-5 to include 6-8, the relationship is more hierarchical. So deªned, hierarchy is a continuous variable deªned by the number of actions over which the dominant state can legitimately issue commands. 27 International Security 32:1 56 26 . These cases and others are discussed in Lake, Entangling Relations, chaps. 5, 6. 27. At least three analytic approaches of long standing in the ªeld have employed the term hierarchy in ways very similar to one another but different from that developed here. Power transition theory posits global and regional hierarchies of power that produce struggles for system leadership and periods of intense warfare. See A. Although sovereignty is often assumed to be indivisible, recent research demonstrates that, in practice, it is frequently divided, with one state acquiring more or less authority over the actions of another. 28 In a prominent set of examples, the United States, asserting an "international police power" under the so-called Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, intervened in Caribbean states more than thirty times between 1898 and 1934 to regulate their foreign and domestic policies. In the case of the Dominican Republic in 1904, for instance, looming debt and fear of European intervention-European warships had entered Dominican waters in 1900 and 1903, and France was again threatening to conªscate tariff revenues-led the local government to request that the United States take over management of its customshouses. This arrangement was later codiªed in an executive agreement under which the United States appointed a customs collector and provided military protection for the republic, and the Dominican government agreed not to increase debts or lower taxes without the consent of Washington. . All three theories treat hierarchy as a structural characteristic, with either a global or regional system organized into a single pyramid for all relevant states. Each deªnes hierarchy as a function of power and, in turn, as material or economic capabilities. "Systemic" in Waltz's use of that term, hierarchy is thus most typically used as a synonym for the distribution of capabilities and, especially, for a highly skewed or unipolar distribution. On the concept of a system, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, especially chap. 5. Hierarchy as stratiªed capabilities is entirely consistent with a view of international politics as a self-help system. See Clark, The Hierarchy of States, p. 3. The concept of hierarchy developed here differs on two counts. First, hierarchy is conceived as a dyadic relationship between two polities that varies across pairs within any system from complete anarchy to full dominance. A single state may possess varying degrees of hierarchy across many dyads, as does the United States today. Nonhegemonic states have certainly exercised more or less authority over other neighboring states and even over distant colonies. Second, as I deªne and use the construct, hierarchy rests on authority, not just on coercive capabilities. 28 Similarly, the United States acquired a partial protectorate over Saudi Arabia during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Faced with a possible threat of invasion from Iraq, Saudi Arabia followed plans ªrst formulated nearly two decades earlier and reluctantly invited more than 500,000 U.S. troops onto its territory to defend the kingdom and expel Iraq from Kuwait. Although Saudi Arabia selfconsciously maintained the trappings of sovereignty during the crisis and eventual war-U.S. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf and His Royal Highness Gen. Khaled bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia were formally equal partners who symbolically held their daily meetings in the latter's ofªce-there was little doubt that the United States controlled the negotiations with Iraq (if any), the planning and ªghting of the war, and the terms of the peace. For all practical purposes, and at least regarding policy toward the Persian Gulf region, the United States assumed substantial authority over Saudi Arabia's foreign policy with the full knowledge and consent of the king. 30 Even with the redeployment of U.S. troops to nearby states or offshore in 2003, the continued dependence of the kingdom on U.S. protection creates a residual subordination. 31 These and other similar instances are best classiªed as cases of divided sovereignty or, in my terms here, partial hierarchy. As the example of Saudi Arabia makes clear, these relationships persist into the current day.
dimensions of international hierarchy A relational approach to authority expects that states within the international system will possess varying degrees of hierarchy. Some states will have few external constraints on their sovereignty. Others will yield authority to other states over some issues for some purposes. Still others will forfeit their authority entirely, being subsumed into another state or empire. In short, there will be a variety of authority relationships, few of which conform fully with the principles of Westphalian sovereignty. Although general principles may serve as guidelines or focal points for negotiations, no two authority relationships are likely to be the same. The contract reached between the two states is likely to reºect a host of internal considerations as well as external conditions. What it means to be "sovereign" in any particular case is likely to vary substantially. These relationships of varying authority constitute international hierarchies.
Authority can be disaggregated and hierarchy constructed in any number of ways. Following common practice in international relations, I ªrst distinguish between the broad issue areas of security and economics, across which the same states often construct relations with different degrees of hierarchy. I then disaggregate these broad issues into the near inªnite number of actions that states might perform that constitute security or economic policy to produce two continua.
Security relationships (the horizontal axis in Figure 1 ) vary from diplomacy, at the anarchic end of the continuum, to protectorates, at the hierarchic end. 32 In diplomacy, polities interact while retaining complete authority over their
Escape from the State of Nature 59 32 . See Lake, Entangling Relations, pp. 24-41; and Weber, Hierarchy amidst Anarchy, p. 4. own actions-including the right to interpret the terms of agreements into which they may enter. This is the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty, again, but limited to the area of security policy and, in extant theory, commonly understood to constitute nearly all security relationships. At the other extreme, one state cedes complete authority to another over its security policy. Such extreme authority relationships, however, seldom exist. Following tradition, I use the term "protectorate" for security hierarchies in which a dominant state exercises authority over many (but not necessarily all) of the subordinate state's possible security policies. In addition to numerous examples in the nineteenth century, including Great Britain's relationships with monarchies in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, the Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands today are close to full protectorates of the United States. Following World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany was also a protectorate of the United States, but it has been steadily asserting a more independent security policy since the end of the occupation in 1954. 33 Between these ideal types lie a range of security relationships of increasing hierarchy.
Economic relationships between polities vary from market exchange, at the anarchic end of the continuum, to dependency, at the hierarchic end (the vertical axis in Figure 1) . 34 Under market exchange, in a manner similar to diplomacy, parties choose to trade, invest, or otherwise engage in economic interactions while retaining full authority over their actions. Like diplomacy, market exchange approximates the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty. Examples include contemporary U.S. economic relationships with many states in Africa. At the opposite end of the continuum, one polity cedes complete authority over all of its economic policies to another polity. Again, such extreme cases are rare, and I use the term "dependency" to cover a range of relationships with near but not necessarily total transfers of authority over economic policy. Relations between the United States and Nicaragua in the early decades of the twentieth century came close to full dependency, in that the former controlled all customs revenues-the primary form of government ªnancing-in the latter. "Dollarization," in which the subordinate adopts the dominant country's currency as its own and imports its monetary policy, also creates a dependency relationship. The most prominent cases of fully dollarized econo- mies today are Ecuador and Panama, which rely exclusively on the U.S. dollar as their legal tender. As with security relationships, there is a range of intermediate forms.
When both security and economic hierarchies exist between two polities, the relationship becomes what is commonly known as either an informal empire or, at an extreme, empire (see Figure 1) . Informal empire combines moderate levels of both security and economic hierarchy, with the subordinate polity ceding substantial but not all authority to a dominant state in both arenas. Relationships between the United States and the countries of Latin America, especially the states in or bordering on the Caribbean, often take the form of informal empire. The Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe during the Cold War is a second example. Empire unites high levels of security and economic hierarchy, with the subordinate polity retaining little or no independent authority over either policy area. The classic cases, of course, were the European overseas empires. The Soviet empire was revealed clearly only when internal instability in 1991 allowed the constituent republics to break free and form independent states-many of which remain in at least partly hierarchical relationships with Moscow. 35 Despite the frequent references to a new American empire after 2003 and the start of the Iraq War, few U.S. relationships today approximate this extreme-found, perhaps, only in the United States' rule over Afghanistan and Iraq prior to the creation of new "sovereign" governments.
operationalizing hierarchy Identifying and, even more so, measuring patterns of authority are extremely difªcult tasks. The core problem is that obligation, central to the difference between authority and other forms of power, is inherently unobservable, even in domestic political systems typically regarded as hierarchic. In international relations, where hierarchy has long been neglected, problems of identifying and measuring authority loom particularly large. Yet, to assess the importance and effects of international hierarchy requires some systematic cross-national indicators. This is, to my knowledge, the ªrst attempt to provide such measures. ows cast on a wall rather than objects themselves. The unobservable nature of authority does not separate this concept from others. Even the concept of "power" or coercive capability in international relations, central to the ªeld, is captured only by proxy through such measures as population, military personnel, GDP, major power status, or the CINC score from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data set. Indicators are never direct measures, only more or less valid reºections of the underlying theoretical constructs.
Equally difªcult is developing measures that discriminate between hierarchy, deªned as variations in authority, and coercive capabilities, the next most closely related form of power. To test for the effects of hierarchy on state behavior, such measures must capture the construct of authority but not correlate highly with the indicators of material capabilities normally associated with coercive capability; that is, the indicators should converge on the construct of hierarchy and discriminate between authority and coercion. The measures here, as a result, aim to capture the legitimacy of the unequal relationships between states, not just differential capabilities in coercion.
All measures are compiled for the United States and all other countries for which data are available from 1950 to 2000. Similar data are not available for other potentially dominant states, limiting analysis here for practical purposes to patterns of U.S. hierarchy in the world system. Security hierarchy is measured by two indicators. The ªrst is the deployment of military forces from the dominant country, the United States, on the territory of each subordinate state. Military troops enable a dominant state to inºuence the security policies of its subordinate. The dominant country can embroil the subordinate in foreign conºicts if it chooses; by launching attacks from the subordinate's territory, for instance, the dominant state automatically implicates the other in the conºict and makes it a target for retaliation by its antagonist, as in the case of the United States and Saudi Arabia in the 1990-91 Gulf War. In turn, the presence of military personnel enables the dominant state to restrain possible foreign policy initiatives of the subordinate. U.S. forces in both Germany and Japan after 1945, for example, not only protected those countries against a possible Soviet invasion but also served to reassure their neighbors against the revival of militarism. Thus, military personnel give a dominant state positive and negative control over a subordinate's security policy. The larger the deployment of forces in the subordinate, the more control the dominant state is likely to exert. To the extent that the subordinate accepts the dominant state's personnel, this control can be regarded as legitimate and, therefore, authoritative.
Overseas troop deployments by the United States are reported annually by
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the Department of Defense. In the measures of hierarchy used here, these deployments are divided by national population, to adjust for differences in country size. The indicator is then normalized to one by its highest value in 1995 to make the measure comparable both over time and with the others explained below. The average level of U.S. troop deployments relative to population has been falling each decade since the 1950s. The second indicator of security hierarchy is the number of independent alliances possessed by the subordinate state. Two states may share many alliances, indicating only that they are embedded in a common security system. Such shared alliances may contain within them a security hierarchy, but this cannot be discerned simply by observing the pattern of relationships. If the dominant and subordinate states possess an alliance but also enter into alliances with other states that are not shared-what I refer to here as "independent alliances"-this is prima facie evidence of foreign policy autonomy. Neither is then obviously dependent on the aid of the other. Most important, the potentially subordinate member has an "outside option" that reduces the dominant state's ability to exercise control. Alternatively, if all of a subordinate's alliances are shared with the dominant state, this may indicate a security hierarchy. The subordinate is then dependent on the dominant state or that state's other allies for assistance. The larger the number of such independent alliances possessed by the subordinate, the less hierarchical the security relationship is likely to be.
The index of independent alliances is deªned as one divided by the number of alliance partners of the subordinate that are not also alliance partners of the dominant state. Higher values represent fewer independent alliances and, by implication, greater hierarchy. In cases where the two states are not themselves allied, the number of independent alliances is treated as zero (no security hierarchy). A striking fact is that in the contemporary era, alliance patterns are strictly exclusive; if a state is allied with one great power, it possesses no other alliances outside the web of alliances held by that great power. 37 The number of independent alliances is an even more indirect measure of hierarchy than is military personnel. Accepting foreign troops is a conscious policy decision and implies at least tacit acceptance by the subordinate of the dominant country's authority. By contrast, the absence of independent alliances need not imply that the state is complicit in its own subordination. A
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subordinate may have many reasons why it does not form alliances with countries other than the dominant state, including the absence of signiªcant external security threats. Yet, to be allied with the dominant state and its other allies but not other states creates a dependence of which the subordinate is surely aware. That the subordinate chooses not to alter this situation implies that it regards the dominant state's inºuence as legitimate and, like military personnel, authoritative. This suggests that smaller numbers of independent alliances are, on average, associated with increasing security hierarchy.
I combine these two measures into an aggregate indicator of U.S. security hierarchy, constructed as the sum of the military personnel and independent alliance indices and itself normalized to one for the highest value in 1995. Given the correlation between the indicators, this facilitates statistical testing (see below). The aggregate index also appears to have better predictive validity, suggesting that it is somewhat more "accurate" than the individual components.
These measures of security hierarchy possess some degree of substantive plausibility or face validity. Mirroring Figure 1 , countries are arrayed along both dimensions of international hierarchy in Figure 2 for 1965 and Figure 3 for 1995. The aggregate index of security hierarchy is arrayed along the horizontal axis. Panama is the most subordinate country in 1995, creating the baseline of one against which other countries are arrayed. 38 Other countries fall into an intuitive pattern, with nearly all Latin American and European states reºecting a degree of security hierarchy in their absence of any independent alliances. Those states commonly regarded as U.S. "clients," such as the Philippines, or "supporters," such as Japan, generally take on higher values. Other states highly subordinate to the United States in security include South Vietnam (1966-70), South Korea (1951-53) , and the Federal Republic of Germany (1955-89). As can be seen by comparing Figures 2 and 3 , levels of security hierarchy change over time.
Economic hierarchy is similarly captured by two indicators. First, economic hierarchy varies inversely with a country's monetary policy autonomy, which is determined, in turn, by its exchange rate regime. 39 Key to any economy's prices and monetary stability is how the price of its national currency is set relative to other currencies. There are three basic types of currency regimes. At one extreme, a country can allow its currency to ºoat against other currencies, with its exchange rate being determined (more or less) by ªnancial markets. Under ºoating exchange rates, domestic monetary policy is freed from concerns about the current account balance and, thus, implies no economic hierarchy. Second, a country can ªx its exchange rate to a single foreign or "anchor" currency, most commonly the dollar or now the euro. By ªxing its exchange rate to an anchor currency, the subordinate state indirectly imports or adopts the monetary policy of the dominant country. Third, a country can adopt the currency of a foreign state as its own, a process known as dollarization. Even though small amounts of the national currency may remain in circulation, the country uses the foreign country's currency as its primary legal tender. Without variable foreign reserves to cushion the impact of external shocks, however, the country directly imports the dominant country's monetary policy. At each step here, the tie between the country's currency and its anchor currency becomes tighter and more costly to break, giving the dominant country more control over the subordinate country's monetary policy. The decision to adopt another country's currency as one's own has enormous symbolic signiªcance, similar to adopting another country's ºag. 40 Debates over ªxed exchange rates and, especially, dollarization typically focus on issues of economic independence and foreign control. To either ªx its exchange rate or dollarize is to consciously acknowledge that the country is subordinating itself, at least in part, to the decisions of another. Because exchange rate regimes are typically chosen with only minimal pressure from the dominant state, but are nonetheless constraining, the control acquired by that state must have at least some measure of legitimacy.
Exchange rate regimes have been studied in some detail and coded in standardized form. 41 I ªrst code a four-point scale ranging from various ºoating exchange rate mechanisms, to a crawling peg tied to the dollar (a mixed system between ºoating and ªxed rates), an exchange rate ªxed to the dollar, and ªnally a "merged" currency in the form of either a currency board or dollar- February 2004) , pp. 1-48, differentiate between the formal or announced exchange rate regime reported by the IMF and the de facto exchange rate regime actually followed by countries, which is preferred because it is closer to the relational conception of authority used here. Christopher M. Meissner and Nienke Oomes extend Reinhart and Rogoff's data to identify the "anchor" currency (if any), or the currency to which another ªxes its currency. Meissner and Oomes, "Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice," paper presented at the Political Economy of Finance conference, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, February 2004. ization. This scale is then normalized to one for the highest value in 1995. Overall, the role of the dollar, and thus U.S. monetary hierarchy, slipped over the 1970s and 1980s as more countries adopted ºoating exchange rates after the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Monetary hierarchy rebounded in the 1990s, however, as more countries outside of Europe either returned to an exchange rate ªxed to the dollar or adopted the dollar as their primary currency.
The second indicator of economic hierarchy is relative trade dependence. Trade has long been understood to create the potential for political inºuence. 42 The key insight here parallels that on independent alliances in security hierarchies. If a state has many trading partners, it is likely to have greater political autonomy; and any attempt to manipulate trade for political purposes will be ineffective. If a country is highly trade dependent on another, however, it is vulnerable to the inºuence of that state. Relative trade dependence is measured as each country's total trade with the United States divided by its own GDP, minus similar ratios for the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, and Russia). The index is truncated at zero (no hierarchy) and normalized to one for the highest value in 1995. The average level of relative trade dependence has ºuctuated over time, reaching highs in the 1980s and 1990s as the U.S. economy led the world into a new era of globalization.
Countries trade for many reasons. In most cases, governments only indirectly inºuence the dyadic pattern of trade as ªrms and entrepreneurs make the microlevel decisions on imports and exports that aggregate into trade dependence. Unlike military personnel and exchange rate regimes, and more like independent alliances, trade patterns may well arise without explicit government decisions being made. Nonetheless, the failure of governments over the long term to diversify their trading partners indicates a tacit acceptance of the dominant state's potential inºuence and therefore its legitimacy and authority.
As with the security measures, an aggregate measure of economic hierarchy is formed by summing the exchange rate and relative trade dependence indices and, again, normalizing the value to one in 1995. According to the aggregate index, Canada is the country most economically subordinate to the United States in 1995, with a high level of relative trade dependence and a cur- These measures of security and economic hierarchy are intended to capture not purely coercive relations between states but, rather, the authority, obligation, and legitimate coercion that are central to hierarchical relationships. 43 The four indicators reºect the more or less discretionary nature of the ties between dominant and subordinate states, and thus at least the passive acquiescence if not the active embrace by subordinates of the dominant state's authority. As Waltz argues, the distribution of capabilities is beyond the ability of any one country to change, and it is these inequalities in capabilities that allow one state to coerce another. 44 The measures here, conversely, imply a degree of voluntarism and, unlike the distribution of capabilities, an ability to alter outcomes unilaterally. As noted, states consent more or less to the authority of dominant states when they accept foreign troops on their soil or ªx their exchange rates. Likewise, states are indirectly signaling their consent when they fail to make efforts to diversify their alliances or trading partners. Without detailed, case-speciªc information, knowing whether subordinate states and their populations accept these hierarchical relationships as legitimate is impossible. But the discretion in these policies and their enduring nature clearly separate these measures analytically from those intended to capture more purely coercive relationships between states.
As noted, all theoretical constructs are inherently unobservable, and all measures are imperfect. In addition to their substantive plausibility or face validity, the indicators are further validated if the several measures of each dimension of hierarchy correlate relatively highly (convergent validity) and each set fails to correlate highly with the next most closely related analytic construct (discriminant validity), which I have suggested above is coercive capabilities or "power" as it is traditionally conceived in international relations theory. 45 
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43. These measures of security and economic hierarchy are clearly tailored to the modern international system. Although I believe that they may be generalizable and appropriate for other historical periods-the British Empire rested as well on overseas troops, the special role of the pound, and trade dependence-they likely reºect a contemporary conception of international authority and hierarchy. Premodern hierarchies most likely rested on other sources and markers of authority. Future hierarchies may well take different forms and manifest themselves in different ways. The indicators are not intended to be universally valid. 44 . Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99. Table 1 presents correlations between the measures of security hierarchy, economic hierarchy, and coercive capabilities for 1995 only. The correlations for other years are very similar.
The coercive capabilities of a state are traditionally measured by material resources, especially by population, number of military personnel, GDP, major power status, and overall CINC score. As expected, and as a baseline for further comparison, the various indicators of coercive capabilities all correlate highly with one another at 0.59. Although not perfectly congruent, this correlation implies that these widely used indicators are all capturing the same underlying construct of coercive capabilities. Likewise, the indicators of security hierarchy are closely related with one another, averaging 0.56 in 1995, as are the indicators of economic hierarchy, averaging 0.53. Like the indicators of coercive capabilities, the measures of security and economic hierarchy possess relatively strong convergent validity. 46 Perhaps more important, neither security nor economic hierarchy is closely related to measures of coercive capability. The correlations between the measures of security hierarchy and coercive capabilities are quite low, averaging only 0.07 in 1995. Surprisingly, security hierarchy is sometimes positively related to the measures of coercive capability, especially GDP and CINC. This positive relationship implies that the countries normally considered to be among the most capable of exerting coercion in international politics are also likely to be among those most subordinate to the United States in security affairs. Indicators of economic hierarchy and coercive capabilities are virtually unrelated to one another, averaging Ϫ0.02 in 1995. Thus, the hierarchy indicators possess not only convergent validity but also strong discriminant validity. This fact does not necessarily "prove" that these indicators are capturing the inherently unobservable construct of hierarchy, but it does show that these measures are capturing something distinct from traditional measures of "power" in international relations.
An Exchange That Matters: Hierarchy and Defense Effort
In contrast to extant theories of international relations, which expect all states to respond to a similar logic of anarchy, the arguments developed above imply
Escape from the State of Nature 69 46 . One possible objection is that the average correlations are inºated by including both the component measures and the aggregate measures of security and economic hierarchy. CINC, however, is also an aggregate indicator composed of measures of energy consumption, iron and steel production (both highly correlated with real GDP), military expenditures, military personnel, total population, and urban population. Not surprisingly, the highest correlations between the various measures of coercive capacity are those between CINC and its components. 
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1. Index of military personnel that a variety of hierarchical relationships exist and, furthermore, that these relationships will have policy consequences. In a relational approach, authority is understood to rest on an exchange relationship between dominant and subordinate states, in which the former provide a social order in return for compliance and legitimacy from the latter. Protected by a dominant state, it follows that subordinate countries should, all else constant, spend fewer of their own resources on security. This relationship, moreover, will be continuous. The greater the hierarchy, the less effort the subordinate country will expend on its own defense. 47 Lower defense expenditures are one of the beneªts that subordinate states receive from giving up a measure of their sovereignty. 48 Anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis. Japan, a protectorate of the United States after 1945, enjoyed legendarily low levels of defense effort. Even in the 1990s, Japanese politicians were reluctant to acknowledge that they were breaking a self-imposed cap on defense spending of 1 percent of GDP, and engaged in some creative accounting to maintain the ªction (standard methods
Escape from the State of Nature 71 put Japan's defense spending at about 1.4 percent of GDP during this period). By comparison, many West European states, also subordinate to the United States, were spending on average 1.8 percent of GDP on defense, and the United States itself was spending 4.0 percent. In Central America and the Caribbean, which the United States has long dominated, states spend about 26 percent of the global average on their militaries. In South America, in a sphere of inºuence dominated by the United States, defense spending is also relatively low, averaging only 47 percent of the global average, despite numerous territorial disputes and provocative actions by historic rivals and long periods of military rule. States and regions subordinate to the United States appear to spend signiªcantly less on defense than others.
To test this hypothesis more systematically, I undertook a time-series crosssectional study of defense spending in all states from 1950 to 2000. Defense effort was operationalized as military expenditures as a share of GDP and then regressed on the indicators of U.S. security and economic hierarchy described above.
In identifying the effects of hierarchy on defense effort, it would be naive to assume that hierarchy is entirely exogenous. If states intentionally choose one or another type of relationship with the United States, it is important to control for the possible determinants of this decision in order to estimate accurately the effect of hierarchy on defense effort. This article does not present a fully developed theory of the formation of hierarchy. 49 Prior theory and an eclectic set of auxiliary arguments suggest three sets of control variables.
First, countries that are more threatened by others are more likely to subordinate themselves to the will of a dominant state in exchange for protection and, thus, are more likely to enter hierarchical relationships. The countries that are most threatened, in other words, are most likely to be willing to yield the sovereignty that subordination entails and, all else constant, to carry a higher than normal defense burden. To identify the effect of hierarchy, therefore, I controlled for foreign threats and measured them in two ways. I created a dummy variable indicating whether the country was involved in a militarized interstate dispute (MID), as deªned by the Correlates of War MID data set. Involvement in a MID indicates the presence of issues between the country and others with a strong potential to escalate to violence. Somewhat more indirectly, I also counted the number of allies other than the United States possessed by the country. This measure is conceptually different from the number of alliances that are independent from the United States, one of the component indicators of security hierarchy. A large number of allies-whether or not they are independent of the United States-suggests a strong need for assistance, which would follow from a perception of external threat. 50 Second, richer countries possess smaller opportunity costs in defense spending. They may therefore be less willing to trade autonomy for external protection and less likely to enter hierarchical relationships. If security is a normal good whose consumption increases with income, this implies that richer countries will both spend more on defense and enter fewer hierarchies. GDP per capita is entered as a control.
Third, to the extent that democracies are more likely to "ºock together," they may be more willing to enter into hierarchical relationships with the United States. 51 If democracies are also more efªcacious in their use of military force, they may bear a smaller defense burden, on average. 52 To separate the effects of hierarchy on defense effort from that of democracy, I included as another control the level of democracy, measured by the Polity2 scale from the Polity IV data set.
The results are presented in Table 2 . 53 Security hierarchy is, as predicted, consistently negative and statistically signiªcant. Countries that are subordinate to the United States on the security dimension do spend proportionately less of their national income on defense. The substantive impact of security hierarchy is substantial. Within the sample of countries used in this estimate, the average country spends approximately 2.57 percent of its GDP on defense each year (standard deviation ϭ 4.74 percent; maximum value ϭ 106 percent for
Escape from the State of Nature 73 50 . The correlation between the number of independent alliances and total alliances is a relatively high 0.78 (for 1995), potentially introducing problems of multicolinearity. Nonetheless, both variables are consistently signiªcant in the regressions below. Dropping "number of other allies" from model 3 in Table 2 does not change the sign or signiªcance level of the index for independent alliances. 53. There is no consensus on the appropriate model for time-series cross-section data. This is especially true when serial correlation is a signiªcant problem, as it is in this study even after including a lagged dependent variable. Given this lack of consensus, the model is estimated in two ways in STATA (version 8. This suggests that the measure of independent alliances has greater explanatory power. Economic hierarchy is never statistically signiªcant and indeed carries the wrong sign. Countries that are economically subordinate to the United States do not enjoy lower defense expenditures. This may be because monetary and trade dependence do not create a sufªciently credible commitment by the United States for subordinates to lower their defense efforts on these grounds alone. It may also reºect a reluctance by countries that are economically dependent on the United States to become dependent in security policy as well. Alternatively, the measures may not be adequately capturing the theoretical construct of economic hierarchy. Interestingly, the two component indices reported in model 3 carry opposite signs, implying that, controlling for the other, they are exerting countervailing effects on defense effort within the aggregate indicator. This requires further research and testing.
In all the models, the covariates carry the anticipated sign and are generally statistically signiªcant. Accounting for levels of security and economic hierarchy, greater external threats and wealth lead to higher levels of defense effort, and democracy leads to lower levels of effort.
To check for robustness, I also included controls for possibly confounding factors not predicted by theory. In results not reported here, dummy variables for the Cold War period (1950-91), geographic location in the Middle East, and membership in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries in the Middle East were all positively related to defense effort and statistically signiªcant. In addition, a dummy variable for membership in the Warsaw Pact, 54 a dummy variable for the presence of an ongoing civil war, and a measure of the similarity of a country's voting record with that of the United States in the United Nations General Assembly were all positive but not signiªcant. None of these additional controls, however, exerted any substantial effect on the size and signiªcance of the security hierarchy measures.
Escape from the State of Nature 75 54 . Given the availability of data on hierarchy only for the United States, the test here is biased against ªnding a signiªcant effect of hierarchy on defense effort. It is likely that a number of countries coded as wholly anarchic are, rather, subordinate to some other state. If such states enjoy lower levels of defense effort, as predicted, then identifying the effect of United States hierarchy will be harder. The unmeasured subordination of these other countries creates, in essence, an omitted variables bias that is expected to reduce the magnitude of the estimated effects of United States hierarchy. The most likely alternative set of hierarchical relationships in the period examined here is the Soviet Union's informal empire over much of Eastern Europe, which I attempt to capture by including membership in the Warsaw Pact. This is, of course, a blunt measure.
A ªnal set of tests examines the relationship between hierarchy and defense effort, controlling for alternative indicators of coercive capabilities. Only the results for overall CINC scores are reported here (see model 4), but those for other measures of capabilities are similar. These results demonstrate clearly that, controlling for levels of hierarchy, measures of coercive capability are not systematically related to defense effort. 55 Countries with larger CINC scores do not spend signiªcantly more or less on defense as a share of GDP than others, nor do major powers or countries with larger economies, as measured by GDP. More populous countries do expend signiªcantly less defense effort, while states with larger numbers of personnel in the military spend signiªcantly more. Interestingly, these results contradict expectations of collective action theory, which predicts that smaller states will free ride on the efforts of larger states, which should (but apparently do not) bear a disproportionately large share of the collective defense burden. 56 Most important, controlling for coercive capabilities does not signiªcantly alter the effect of security hierarchy on defense effort. As seen in Table 1 , there is a small but positive correlation between GDP and CINC scores, on the one hand, and the measures of security hierarchy, on the other. Yet, controlling for coercive capabilities does not change the central effect of security hierarchy on defense effort. The coefªcients on the index of security hierarchy in models 1 and 4 are nearly identical, demonstrating that the effect of security hierarchy is not spurious or produced by some process related to overall international "power" as traditionally conceived.
These results generally support the hypothesis that hierarchy leads to lower levels of defense effort. Countries subordinate to the United States in security affairs enjoy lower defense expenditures as a proportion of national income. Economic hierarchy, though, appears not to produce lower defense effort. Why this is so requires further investigation. Overall, the strong effect of security hierarchy implies that states do not rely on self-help or balance against their dominant protectors. Rather, they trade subordination for protection, or at least take advantage of their subordination to lower their military burdens and
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55. This model is, admittedly, not designed as a test of coercive capability on defense effort. Most important, the covariates for coercive capability are not likely to be the same as for security and economic hierarchy. Before concluding that coercive capabilities have no effect on defense effort, one would want to identify and control for those variables that correlate with both coercive capabilities and defense effort. place responsibility for their defense on the dominant state. States do not give up their sovereignty lightly, of course, but the material beneªts of subordination can be substantial.
Conclusion
To accept that hierarchy exists within the international system is not to negate everything known about world politics. As the empirical analysis suggests, states may still respond to and adjust their defense efforts to the threats they confront. Great powers may still engage in realpolitik in their more anarchic relations with each other. But uncovering the international hierarchies now ignored by international relations theory reveals an alternate, more complex, and less than unique political world that, as the empirical results demonstrate, affects national behavior whether scholars choose to acknowledge it or not.
Reintegrating hierarchy into theories of international relations will prompt signiªcant changes in the collective research agenda of scholars. A next step should be to document other behavioral implications of international hierarchy. Defense effort is one key policy, of course, central to realist and other security-oriented theories of international relations. Further theorizing and empirical analyses may suggest, for instance, that hierarchy produces higher rates of economic growth, as well as longer tenures for leaders. Hierarchy is also likely to affect the policies and behavior of dominant states. Future research should focus on if and how dominant states produce social order for their subordinates, how they discipline subordinates that defect from the rules of that social order, and how they credibly commit not to abuse the authority conferred on them by subordinates. Finally, to the extent that hierarchy exerts important effects on state behavior, future research will need to consider how the number and extent of international hierarchies affect the nature and dynamics of the international system as a whole.
More generally, anarchy has long been understood as the distinguishing feature of international relations. Even though in recent years scholars have challenged the separation of domestic and international politics, anarchy has remained central to the latter. 57 Hierarchy in international relations further erodes the supposed differences between domestic and international politics. Just as scholars now accept that anarchic, self-governing institutions such as the United States Congress exist in the domestic arena, so may hierarchic, authoritative relationships such as that between the United States and Germany or Japan exist in the international realm. Rather than separating analysis into autonomous spheres, our understanding would be better served by arraying different sets of political institutions, issue areas, and historical periods along continua of more or less political hierarchy.
A focus on hierarchy also raises a host of new questions for international relations research. If it does not arise from formal-legal institutions, where does authority "come from"? What makes a state's command authoritative in one context, but purely coercive in another? Both the dominant state's ability to provide a beneªcial social order to its subordinates and the prevailing ideas and norms on appropriate action are likely to matter, but in different times, places, and ways. 58 This article has sought to open up a role for authority in international relations theory without prejudging its ultimate sources. But to the extent that hierarchy matters in international relations, it prompts new attention to the origins and nature of legitimate action between states.
Finally, a focus on hierarchy promises new insights into current international politics and, especially, the role of the United States in the world today. That the United States dominates the global system like none before is often repeated but little understood. Analysts talk of various forms of soft power believed to enhance the ability of the United States to accomplish its aims. 59 States. In demanding the right to change the regime in Baghdad, the United States overstepped its authority and was forced to ªght the war in Iraq without the legitimacy provided by broad international support. In the Islamic world and beyond, growing numbers resent, challenge, and possibly deny the legitimacy of U.S. actions in the Middle East. Central to a relational conception of authority is the insight that rule rests on the consent of the ruled. If current resentments reach a critical mass, the international authority of the United States might evaporate overnight-much as the authority of the East European governments simply dissolved in the face of mass dissent in 1989. At the same time, the administration of President George W. Bush, seeing the world through Hobbesian lenses, has shifted U.S. foreign policy away from a reliance on authority to one increasingly dependent on coercion, provoking cries of a new imperialism and a debate on a new empire, referenced in the introduction. The hierarchies created and nurtured by the United States over the last century have been a source of order and, in turn, peace and prosperity for both the United States and its subordinate states. Yet, dependent on the legitimacy conferred by subordinates, hierarchy is a fragile relationship, easily abused. We fail to recognize the nature and role of authority in the international system at our peril.
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